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This thesis examines share repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2020 on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE). This dissertation provides new research on share repurchases in Norway by 
investigating an unexamined period. The majority of studies are conducted in larger 
economies, while this thesis adds literature on the phenomena on the OSE. Previous research 
by Settem (2008) examines share repurchase transactions from 2002 to 2004, uncovering 
significant abnormal returns from share repurchases. This is equivalent to Skjeltorp's (2004) 
previous findings. However, our study measures the signaling effect of repurchase 
announcements. This thesis finds a positive short-term abnormal return following a share 
repurchase announcement. Contrary to previous findings, the size of the repurchase seems to 
have a significant impact on the abnormal return. In addition to the quantitative analysis, seven 
interviews were conducted to enlighten the subject further and highlight how various 
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Share repurchases has been a controversial topic since the introduction on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE) in 1999. Some claim that executives could use repurchase programs to obtain 
higher salary compensation by increasing the Earnings Per Share (EPS). Another view is that 
repurchase programs damage the balance sheet and the willingness of companies to invest in 
new projects by consuming too much capital. This can result in lost investment opportunities 
because the financial resources are already tied to buyback programs (Vu, 2017). In addition, 
the repurchases could increase the risk of default by raising the debt-to-equity ratios. 
 
In theory, a share repurchase is no different from an ordinary cash dividend since the 
compensation method is irrelevant as long the shareholders receive a portion of the profits over 
time. This is naturally not the case if the method of compensation leads to a higher net payment 
to a shareholder due to tax conditions or other frictions, which could make one of the methods 
superior. Several studies from different markets show that companies that announce a share 
repurchase program experience a risk-adjusted excess return of 2-3 percent in the days 
surrounding the share repurchase announcement (Skjeltorp, 2004). Despite various criticism, 
buybacks are more popular than ever and have been a common way of returning excess cash to 
shareholders, especially in the US. However, share repurchases in Norway are not as popular. 
 
Literature on share repurchases provides a long list of hypotheses for why a company decides 
to repurchase their shares; substitution for dividends, corporate signaling hypothesis, takeover 
deterrence hypothesis, capital structure, and excess cash distribution. All the different 
hypotheses are plausible, but several previous articles have found corporate signaling as the 
most recurring reason (Vermaelen 1981., Dann 1981).  Announcing that a firm will repurchase 
shares could be perceived as a signal to the market that the management believes the share is 
undervalued. If the market is efficient, the price should be adjusted immediately. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok & Vermalen (1995) found that the two most common reasons for repurchasing 
shares are undervaluation and investment purposes. On the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), there 
is a significant overweight of employee programs being the reason for announcing a share 
repurchase program. This assertion was further substantiated by the collected data and the 





This thesis attempts to measure the connection between share repurchase announcements and 
abnormal returns. The first chapters will guide the reader through different share repurchase 
methods and the different hypotheses of why companies conduct a share repurchase. Secondly, 
the event study methodology presented by MacKinlay (1997) was utilized to measure the 
abnormal return following a repurchase announcement. Further, several regression models were 
employed on the abnormal return to measure how different variables affect the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR). Lastly, qualitative interviews were conducted to further substantiate 





2. Share Repurchase  
A share repurchase is when a company decides to purchase back its shares from the market, 
reducing the total amount of shares on the marketplace. Corporations usually repurchase 
shares if they consider their stock to be undervalued or return excess cash to investors 
(Dittmar, 2000). Furthermore, share repurchases decrease the number of shares outstanding, 
thus increases the Earnings Per Share. Increasing the EPS would elevate the market value of 
the remaining shares. Other common reasons for repurchasing shares would be to offer shares 
to employees through employee programs or to adjust the capital structure. 
2.1 Share Repurchase Announcement 
The process of repurchasing shares is authorized at the annual general meetings. When 
announcing a share repurchase program, the announcement commonly contains information 
on the number of shares being purchased and the preferred price range. However, the 
management is not obligated to announce when the repurchase program starts. In addition, 
organizations are not obligated to publish a public announcement regarding the repurchase. 
Thus, after being granted authorization, the firm is at liberty to repurchase shares whenever 
they prefer.  
2.2 Share Repurchase as Pay-out Policy 
Share repurchase is an activity where companies acquire their own shares, and shareholders 
who want to sell their shares back to the firm will be compensated. As a result, share 
repurchase can be perceived as a way for a corporation to allocate cash to smaller groups of 
shareholders, while dividends are distributed to all shareholders. This makes repurchases a 
more flexible approach of returning excess cash to shareholders. Share repurchases are a 
modern form of pay-out policy compared to dividends, which have been around for centuries. 
For Norwegian citizens, the taxation of dividends and share repurchases are similar. Therefore, 
dividends are usually preferred. Nonetheless, some countries have strict taxation on dividends 
which could make share repurchases the preferred way of distributing the profits for certain 





2.3 Stock Buyback Methods 
There are four different ways of conducting a share repurchase; share repurchase by direct 
negotiation, share repurchase using a Dutch auction, share repurchase at a fixed price, and 
lastly, share repurchase in an open market. Each method has different characteristics and is 
suitable for different purposes and companies. However, open market repurchases are the most 
common method and the most frequently applied (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000).  
2.3.1 Direct Negotiation 
This method allows a corporation to repurchase shares from certain large shareholders at a 
pre-determined price between the company and the shareholder(s). This method is usually 
preferred when the company wants to protect itself from a hostile takeover, and therefore the 
price usually includes a premium. The main advantage of this buyback method is that the 
company can negotiate the buyback directly with the shareholders. In addition, direct 
negotiation allows shareholders to sell larger amounts of shares, even when the stock suffers 
from a low trading volume. This method could also be applied when firms buy back shares 
from employees, with the price usually equal to the current market price.  
2.3.2 Dutch Auction Tender Offer 
Under a Dutch auction, companies would offer their shares within a price range instead of at 
a fixed price. Shareholders submit bids by stating the total number of shares and the lowest 
price they are willing to accept. Following the auction, the corporation receives the offers from 
shareholders and determines a reasonable price within the previously announced price range 
until the share buyback is finished. Compared to a fixed price tender offer, closing a Dutch 
auction typically results in a lower price per share. Nonetheless, the price in an open market 
repurchase usually is even lower.  
2.3.3 Fixed-Price Tender Offer 
Fixed-price tender offers invite shareholders to sell their shares at a pre-specified price within 
a chosen time period. The offer is usually higher than the prevailing selling price, and the 
shares are usually offered at a premium. If a company wants to repurchase a significant number 





number of shares is lower than the company’s preferred amount, all the shares in the tender 
offer will be repurchased.  
2.3.4 Open Market Buybacks 
In an open market repurchase, the company buys its shares directly in the stock market. Open 
market repurchases are the preferred and most frequent method of conducting a share 
repurchase (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). When announcing a repurchase program, the 
company does not impose any legal obligation to complete the program. An open market 
repurchase usually has a longer duration and involves repurchasing a higher number of shares 
compared to other methods. Furthermore, it is the most cost-effective way to execute a share 
repurchase while also providing the most flexibility.  
2.4 Share Repurchase on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
Repurchase of own shares is a well-documented concept, but most studies are conducted in 
the US and other larger economies. In Norway, share repurchase was forbidden until 1999. 
Therefore, it can be considered a relatively new method to distribute cash to shareholders, 
compared to dividends. Share repurchases are regulated by the Securities Act of June 13, 1997 
(Aksjeloven) and the Securities Trading Act of June 29, 2007 (Verdipapirhandelloven). The 
Securities Trading Act prohibits a firm from buying more than ten percent of outstanding share 
capital.  Nonetheless, the trade size cannot exceed 25 percent of the average traded volume of 
shares in the last calendar month. Furthermore, all repurchase transactions executed by a 
company are obligated to be made public immediately and at the latest before the opening of 
the next trading day. In addition, the information published must contain the volume and price 
of the shares that have been repurchased.  
 
Oslo Stock Exchange implemented new regulations regarding share repurchases March 1th, 
2021. Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) was implemented to stabilize the stock prices and 
further regulate buybacks in Norway. The regulations are a so-called “Safe Harbour” 
regulation which means that repurchases and price stabilizations carried out outside the 
framework of the regulation must be assessed against the rules of insider trading and market 
manipulation (Euronext, 2021). MAR has been implemented in the European Union since 





3. Theory and Litterature Review  
This chapter briefly introduces relevant theories within corporate finance suitable for our 
research on share repurchases. In addition, we will present relevant research on the subject. 
Lastly, alternative hypothesizes on why companies repurchase their shares will be presented.  
3.1 Literature Review on Share Repurchases 
Miller and Modigliani (M&M) presented a theorem that the investors should perceive 
dividends and share repurchases as perfect substitutes when considering perfect capital 
markets (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Furthermore, M&M defined a perfect capital market 
under the following assumptions:  
- Equal and costless access to all information   
- No taxes, fees, or other transaction costs 
- Rational investor behavior 
- No difference between distributed and undistributed profits, dividends, and capital gains 
- Perfect certainty, complete assurance of future investments and profits  
Research within economics has presented evidence that these assumptions do not always hold. 
Within the subject of share repurchases, previous research has mostly tried to explain the 
positive return that follows the share repurchase announcements. Therefore, like previous 
research, this dissertation aims to measure if share repurchase announcements will generate a 
positive abnormal return, but for shares listed on the OSE.  
3.2 Capital Structure  
The optimal capital structure is the combination of equity and debt financing, which 
maximizes a company’s market value and minimizes its cost of capital. The stock valuation is 
independent of its capital structure in perfect capital markets (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
M&M theorem is the foundation of modern capital structure theory. The company’s value is 
calculated purely by future cash flows unaffected by debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Hence, 
there are no advantages of borrowing compared to issuing equity in the absence of market 





firm valuation is constant for all capital structures. This theoretical contribution is referred to 
as the capital structure irrelevance result (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If the theorem holds, 
various imperfections such as bankruptcy costs and corporate tax rates should not influence 
real-world capital markets. Taxation of corporate profits and the existence of bankruptcy 
penalties are market imperfections that are central to a positive theory of the effect of leverage 
on the firm's market value (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973).   
 
Feldstein and Green (1983) found out that a share repurchase is preferred over dividends to 
increase the leverage ratio, mainly because the market imposes a penalty on firms that later 
decide to reduce their dividend yield. In addition, Feldstein and Green (1983) also state that 
companies with a leverage ratio below the optimal level are more likely to repurchase shares. 
Another theory related to the optimal capital structure is the pecking order theory developed 
by Donaldson (1961), later extended by Majluf and Myers (1984). According to the theory, 
capital structure is a result of cash flow generation, investment opportunities, and cash 
distribution to shareholders. Corporations prefer internal financing. However, this could be 
difficult to achieve since dividends tend to be “sticky” (Guttman, Kadan & Kandel, 2010). 
Resulting in internal funds used for investments being subject to unpredictable fluctuations. 
In addition, firms with leverage below the optimal level of capital do not have to engage in 
share repurchases to increase their leverage, but mostly because they are profitable and thereby 
need to distribute cash to their shareholders.  
3.3 Market Efficiency  
The efficient market hypothesis (EHM) is one of economics most well-studied theorems. Fama 
(1970) proposed the efficient market hypothesis, which states that a market is efficient if 
security prices represent all available information. Fama (1970) later claimed that fundamental 
research and security analysis is a loser´s game. The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox states that 
markets are efficient due to the contrary belief of individuals that markets are not efficient 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Therefore, investors spend a significant amount of time 
researching to extract any mispricing that occurs in the market.  According to Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), new knowledge is automatically incorporated into the stock prices when there 
is an equilibrium number of these investors. It has been common since Roberts (1959) to 





claims that all past information is reflected in today’s stock price. The semi-strong form 
includes all past and all public information to be reflected in the stock price. Lastly, the strong 
form states that both public and private information is reflected in the stock price.  
3.4 Why do Companies Repurchase Their Shares?  
Previous research in share repurchases has focused on explaining why there is an observable 
abnormal return on firms repurchasing shares. Different hypothesizes have been tested as the 
research in this field has progressed. This section will elaborate on the most central hypotheses 
regarding the subject of share repurchase programs.  
3.4.1 Signaling Hypothesis 
Signaling theory assumes information is not equally available for all parties simultaneously. 
The signaling theory is considered a dominant motivation behind a company’s decision to 
repurchase shares. The theory implies that investors will have a more optimistic perception of 
future earnings (and other profitability measures) following a share repurchase announcement 
(Grullon & Michaely, 2004). Managers who want to minimize information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders could use the signal effect of a share repurchase to convince 
investors that the company’s valuation is too low. Vermaelen (2005) gave a broad definition 
of signaling as “An attempt to communicate to investors that their current forecasts about 
future performance are too pessimistic.”   
 
The signaling hypothesis is the most documented and accepted. Dann (1981) and Vermaelen 
(1981) have found evidence of abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements 
in the US. According to the efficient market theorem, investors should discount the new 
information presented by the announcement, which would lead to the stock price adjusting 
immediately. Ikenberry et al. (1995) support the hypothesis that companies repurchasing 
shares experienced positive abnormal returns in the following years.  
3.4.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
The free cash flow hypothesis states that free cash flows should be distributed to all 





(Jensen, 1986). In addition, share repurchases are considered a solution to minimize high 
spending from managers due to rich cash positions. Agency cost appears when managers work 
for their own benefits instead of maximizing shareholder's return (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Examples of this could be when a company has excess cash and poor investment opportunities, 
with the manager potentially investing out of self-interest, destroying firm value. However, 
when announcing a share repurchase program, the market interprets that management is less 
likely to waste cash with poor investment opportunities.  
3.4.3 Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
The dividend substitution hypothesis considers share repurchases as a substitute for a dividend 
pay-out policy. Managers can choose to return excess cash to shareholders through a share 
repurchase instead of a dividend. Share repurchases are a flexible way of distributing the 
profits to selected shareholders compared to dividends, where all shareholders are 
compensated based on their amount of shares. In addition, dividends are “sticky”, and the 
market punishes a reduction in the dividend yield because of pessimistic prospects (Guttman 
et al., 2010). However, repurchases are not “sticky”, and companies can decide to spend vast 
amounts of cash on share repurchases one year without being obligated to repurchase the 
following year (Guttman et al., 2010).   
3.4.4 Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis 
Another motive for share repurchases could be to reduce the chance of hostile takeovers. 
According to Bagwell (1991), a repurchase could raise the takeover cost because the 
shareholders willing to tender commonly are those with the lowest valuations. The repurchase 
thereby skews the distribution of remaining shareholders toward a more expensive pool, 
lowering the takeover's attractiveness (Bagwell, 1991). In addition, a repurchase could also 
increase the ownership concentration for current shareholders, which again reduces the 
chances of a potential takeover (Skjeltorp, 2004). Dann and DeAngelo (1988) have found 
support for the takeover deterrence hypothesis as a partly motivation for share repurchase. In 
addition, their research discovered that repurchase had a negative effect prior to a takeover. 
This could indicate that the public perceives the repurchase as an attempt to prevent a value-
creating takeover. Lastly, research by Billett and Hui (2007) discovered a close link between 





4. Methodology  
This chapter presents the methodology and methods used in this thesis. First, the event study 
methodology presented by MacKinlay (1997) is described. Then, related articles are recited in 
order to highlight the methodology’s potential advantages and drawbacks. Furthermore, a brief 
introduction to the cross-sectional regression approach is presented. The last section presents 
the method used to obtain primary data. In order to collect primary data for this analysis, 
interviews were chosen. Which further supplements the event study methodology and add 
additional insight regarding the researched topic.  
4.1 Event Study 
Event studies can be used to measure the effect from a corporate event or action. The initial 
task of conducting an event study is to define the event of interest, in this case, share 
repurchase announcements, and identify the period over which the security prices of the firms 
involved in the event will be examined (MacKinlay, 1997). The event study methodology 
traces back to the 1930s and has been discussed in numerous publications. However, for the 




Event Study Timeline 
                    Estimation Window                                              Event Date 
 
               T0                                                     T1                       T2                          0                              T3                                  
Note.- This figure illustrates the event study timeline. The period between T0 and T1 represents the 
chosen estimation window. T2 and T3 illustrate the starting and ending point of the event window. 






4.1.2 Estimation Window 
The estimation period is a selected time frame before and after the event occurs, consisting of 
a selected number of days where the stock is traded. MacKinlay (1997) states that the period 
prior to the event window will be the best choice as the estimation window when feasible. 
Generally, there is no correct answer for the duration of the estimation window, therefore 
dependent on the event of interest. In this study, daily stock returns are employed, and 
therefore an estimation window of 250 days (approximately one trading year) was selected 
prior to the share repurchase announcement. To avoid interference with the event of interest, 
the estimation window is set to end 20 days before the repurchase announcement (MacKinlay, 
1997). The estimation window can further be explained as: ("! = −271	)*+	"" = −21).  
4.1.3 Event Window 
The event window should reflect the amount of time the market requires to absorb and react 
to new information (Kriving et al., 2003). The well-studied theorem of the efficient market 
hypothesis implies that financial markets are efficient. However, various studies have found 
contradicting evidence. This raised the concern that there is no theoretically correct event 
window and thereby no finite answer for the length of the event window. To account for 
possible information leakages and delayed reactions, abnormal returns over several event 
windows: (-2,2), (-1,2), (-1,1), (0,1) and (0,2) was examined.  
4.2 Cross-Sectional Model 
Cross-sectional models can provide insight on which factors are associated with the variation 
in the abnormal return (MacKinlay, 1997). Given a sample of N abnormal return observations 
and M characteristics, the regression model can be written as followed according to Mackinlay 
(1997):    
,-# = .! + ."0$% +⋯++.&0'% + 2# 
342#5 = 0 
When utilized, a cross-sectional analysis could add valuable insights into which factors explain 





4.3 Expected Return  
The foundation of the event study methodology is to estimate the expected returns. MacKinlay 
(1997) presents several models for calculating expecting returns. However, this thesis will 
utilize the Market Model. The reasoning behind this decision is based on the possibility that 
various models could produce different results. Thus, justifying which of the models created 
the most accurate expected return is hard to determine and is not the purpose of this thesis. 
4.3.1 Market Model 
The Market Model is a statistical model that connects the return of any given security to the 
market portfolio’s return (MacKinlay, 1997). The model’s linear specification follows an 
assumption of normal distributed multivariate stock return. For every event in our sample, 
alphas (a) and betas (b) are calculated for each individual stock, based on the linear relation 
between the share and the market portfolio. The following equation calculates the expected 
return:  
 
-() = 7( + 8(-&) + 9() 
3(9() = 0) 
;)<(9()) = =*(+  
 
-', represents the return from the market portfolio, while 9() captures the unsystematic risk 
related to each security. 8( reflects how the individual stock fluctuates when the market 
portfolio increases or decreases.  The intercept 7( and the coefficient 8( is estimated by 
regressing each securities return on the market portfolio. By removing the portion of the return 
related to variation in the market return, the variance of the abnormal return is reduced 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The market model is an example of a single-factor model, where the 
volatility from a selected stock is compared to the market return volatility. This is then used 
to predict how the stock moves with the chosen benchmark (usually the market). More 
advanced models exist. However, as MacKinlay (1997) states, the benefit of using such 





4.4 Abnormal Return  
Abnormal Return (AR) describes an unusual profit or loss generated by a given investment or 
portfolio over a specific time window. The abnormal return surrounding the event is estimated 
as the difference between the stock's actual return and the predicted normal return (Bodie, 
Kane, Marcus, 2018). The two methods commonly used to measure abnormal returns over the 
chosen event window are the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHAR). This thesis will utilize the CAR. The mathematical equations 
used to compute abnormal returns:    
  
,-() = -() − 3(-()) 
 
4.4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns are simply the sum of all abnormal returns over the period of 
interest (Bodie et al., 2018). The CAR captures the total firm-specific stock movement for an 
entire period when the market responds to new information. Information leakage and the 
possible slow reactions from the market make the abnormal return on announcement day a 
poor indicator for measuring the total impact of a repurchase announcement. To calculate the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for a sample, the CAR’s are aggregated and 
then divided by the number of events denoted by N. Both the mathematical expression for 
















4.5 Significance Testing 
In order to assess the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, literature distinguished 
between parametric and non-parametric tests. Non-parametric tests do not assume regular 
distribution, while parametric tests do (MacKinlay, 1997). Therefore, for simplicity, this 
analysis will assume a normal distribution of the selected samples. Further, the traditional t-
test and the two-sample test (p-value) are employed in the analysis section to test if the results 
are statically different from zero.    
4.6 Limitations of Event Studies 
The event study methodology also has its drawbacks, despite the extensive research.  As a 
result of this, it is essential to discuss the potential drawbacks of this analysis and how we have 
attempted to overcome these obstacles. 
 
The outcomes are predicated on the assumption that the event date has been accurately 
determined and not anticipated (MacKinlay, 1997). Following this statement, this thesis 
assumes that the share repurchase announcements are not anticipated, and none of the 
investors have obtained the information before the announcements.  Another limitation to the 
event study methodology is the estimation of the expected returns used to compute the CAR. 
MacKinlay (1997) states that the market model is a simple single-factor model with many 
drawbacks. However, more advanced models will not guarantee more precise results.  
Finally, the analysis aggregating abnormal returns has assumed that the event windows of the 
included securities do not overlap in calendar time. This assumption gives the ability to 
compute the variance of the aggregated sample without concern about the covariance across 
different securities because they are zero (MacKinlay, 1997). One way to handle clustering is 
to remove all events that occur simultaneously. However, this could be problematic due to the 
risk of removing potentially interesting observations. In addition, different companies are 
affected by many of the same economic factors (Kothari et al., 2006). These effects will 
naturally be more significant if any of the companies in the sample have the same 
characteristics, which may occur on an oil-exposed stock exchange such as the OSE (see 





4.7 Interviews  
Seven interviews are conducted to gather primary data for this analysis and to further 
supplement the applied event study in this thesis. The interviews were conducted as structured 
interviews using an interview guide, where all participants were asked the same questions (see 
Appendix B). The qualitative findings from interviews will be presented in the analysis.  
 
The interview guide followed a logical structure, which first presented the authors and the 
purpose of this thesis before presenting the interview objects with the six pre-made questions.   
All questions were open-ended, allowing the respondents to answer freely and describe the 
topic based on their perception (Saunders et al., 2009).  
This study was reported to the Norwegian Centre of Research Data (NSD, 2021) to ensure that 
personal data is treated with discretion. Therefore, the study does not name any participants 
nor contain enough information to identify them. All information collected will be deleted 







The purpose of this chapter is to explain our data selection process. Following that, offer a 
descriptive overview of sample features and additional insight into these results, which might 
be of interest to the analysis. Finally, provide a quick overview of the announced share 
repurchases on the Oslo Stock Exchange, which is grouped into one sample and to different 
subsamples in the analysis. 
5.1 Data Sample  
The data for daily stock returns from the year 2000 to 2020 was provided by Børsprosjektet 
(NHH, 2021). Børsprosjektet is a database available for all students and employees at NHH 
and a provider of financial data. The data sample retrieved contained daily returns for all 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the relevant period. In addition, the 
repurchase announcements were manually collected from NewsWeb (2021), which is further 
addressed in the following section.   
5.1.1 Data Characteristics 
Companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange are obligated to provide information on share 
repurchase activity. The information is published on NewsWeb. This is a service delivered by 
the OSE and provides financial information for all companies listed on the exchange. All share 
repurchase announcements were manually gathered from NewsWeb by applying a 
combination of search words like “Repurchase,” “Program,” “Buyback,” “Own”, “Own 
Shares,” and “Shares” for each company. This resulted in 205 separate share repurchase 
announcements. In addition, 417 share repurchase authorizations from annual general 
meetings were gathered. However, the authorizations granted at the annual general meetings 
are not included in this analysis due to the additional information these meetings provide. This 
creates a large amount of interference and makes it impossible to only measure the effect from 
the repurchases. Furthermore, these authorizations do not necessarily state that the companies 
will conduct the repurchases but rather grants them the option. Lastly, this analysis utilizes 







Yearly Repurchase Announcements From 2000 to 2020 
 
NOTE.- This figure displays the yearly number of repurchase announcements over the selected 
period from 2000 to 2020. Most of the observations are from the most recent years, which is 
further discussed in section 7.1.  
The total amount of repurchase announcements is 205. 
 
5.2 Independent Variables 
This section will describe the independent variables employed in the cross-sectional analysis, 
with some elaborations for the inclusion of these variables.  
5.2.1 Market Capitalization  
The company's size can be a relevant factor related to the market reaction of share repurchase 
announcements for several reasons. The first is connected to information asymmetry. Larger 
companies experience a lower form of information asymmetry because of wider media and 
analyst coverage (Vermaelen, 1981). Secondly, larger and more mature companies usually 
have limited growth potential. Instead of investing in new projects, the excess cash is usually 














2008). As a result, the individual market capitalizations in NOK are included as an explanatory 
variable to examine if the company size affects the return following a buyback announcement. 
The market capitalization is computed using the current amount of outstanding shares and the 
share price on the announcement day. The natural logarithm was used to get a more consistent 
result because of the vast range in the market capitalization between the companies.  
5.2.2 Size of Repurchase Program 
All companies in the dataset either contained the planned number of shares or the total amount 
of cash spent during the program. Moreover, the size of the repurchase program was scaled 
with the market capitalization for each observation. This was computed by dividing the size 
of the buyback program in NOK by the respective market capitalization. Previous research 
found that returns positively correlate with the repurchase size (Comment & Jarrell, 1991).  
5.2.3 Liquidity 
The stock's liquidity is a measure of how rapidly the stock is being traded and how easily it 
can be bought or sold without substantially impacting the price of the stock. The liquidity has 
been computed by dividing the average number of daily traded stocks, with the total number 
of outstanding shares, over 21 days (approximately one trading month), 20 days prior to the 
repurchase announcement. Cook et al. (2004) find that a share repurchase increases liquidity. 
However, this thesis attempt to measure if the liquidity of the stocks impacts the abnormal 
returns.  
5.2.4 Trend 
Share trend is a measurement of the firm’s performance before the share repurchase 
announcement. In order to capture the recent performance of the stock, a 21-day estimation 
window (approximately one trading month) is included. This is computed using the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return. To avoid the trend overlapping with the event window and 
potentially affecting the trend variable, an estimation window that ends 20-days prior to the 
event was chosen (>,-,367+	)9	,36+"). Applying this factor in the cross-sectional regressions 






5.2.5 Proceeds of Use 
Most of the companies in the data sample have included the proceeds of use in the share 
repurchase announcement (see Appendix D). Dummy variables were included to represent 
each category to see if the proceeds of use impact the abnormal return. Employee Program is 
repurchased shares for employee purposes and bonus schemes. Book Building contains 
announcements where the goal is to build up the firm’s base of treasury shares. This is to meet 
future obligations surrounding the demand in their stocks for different reasons, such as stock 
transactions. Repurchases in the category Increase Return have the sole purpose of 
compensating shareholders and increase their returns. Capital Structure is adjusting the capital 
structure by increasing the debt-to-equity ratio from repurchasing shares. The last category is 
Not Specified and consists of buybacks where the proceeds of use are not specified at the time 
of the announcement. The total number of observations for each category is presented in the 
table below.  
Table (5.1) 
Proceeds of Use, Number of Observation per Category 
 Number of observations 
Employee Program 80 
Book Building 19 
Increase Return 37 
Capital Structure 29 
Not Specified 40 
Total 205 









5.2.6 Return on Equity 
Return on Equity (ROE), along with Return on Assets (ROA), are some of the all-time 
favorites and perhaps most widely used measures of corporate financial performance 
(Rappaport, 1986). The ROE was calculated by taking the profit after tax and dividing it by 
the average book value of equity from the previous and the current year. 
5.2.7 Program Length 
The program length is commonly reported in the share repurchase announcement. However, 
for some companies, this information was not included in the announcement. Therefore, the 
last repurchase connected to the announcement was identified, and the length of the program 
was manually calculated. For example, some repurchase programs only last a day, while some 
have a duration of approximately one year. This variable is included to measure if the duration 
of the program has any significant effect on the abnormal returns.  
5.2.8 Miscellaneous Binary Variables 
In the cross-sectional analysis, several miscellaneous dummy variables are included; The first 
variable is Dividend. This is a variable with the value of one if the firm has paid a dividend in 
the year prior to the event and zero otherwise. Secondly, Previous Buyback is a variable 
present if the firm has conducted buybacks in the last calendar year. Thirdly, Issuing is active 
if the firm has issued new equity within the previous year. Broker is a dummy variable active 
if the repurchasing company has hired a third party to assist in the share repurchase. The 
variable Premium is active if the company has announced that they are willing to pay a 
premium when they acquire the shares. Lastly, the variable Financial Crisis is present if the 
repurchase is done during the Great Recession.   
5.3 Primary Data 
Primary data is collected from structural interviews to supplement the event study by adding 
additional information and more profound insight regarding share repurchases on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. These findings will be presented in the analysis. Several CFOs, CEOs, Head 
of Analysis, and other executives were strategically selected to provide valuable knowledge 





utilized (presented in Appendix B) followed six questions regarding share repurchases: the 
usage of own shares, price perspective, previous experiences, announcements, and their view 
on the phenomena.  
5.4 Data Problems 
One of the most recurring issues with the collected data was that several observations for the 
daily stock returns were missing for some companies. The most significant problem was the 
absence of stock return observations in the selected event windows. Consequently, some 
observations had to be excluded because the belonging returns used to calculate the abnormal 
return were missing. Furthermore, a similar problem was encountered, where some companies 
missed entire months of stock returns. This made it impossible to employ the market model 
regression in the estimations period and, therefore, difficult to calculate the expected return. 
These two problems with the daily stock return appeared more frequently with the earlier 
observations. In addition, there was a limited amount of announcements regarding share 
repurchase programs. We assume this is because the majority of companies on the OSE do not 
signal the initiation of a share repurchase program, rather start the process after being granted 







This chapter introduces the results from the conducted analysis. First, three individual samples 
from the same dataset will be presented. The market model will then be employed to calculate 
the abnormal return from each individual sample. Further on, we will utilize four separate 
regression models to determine how independent variables influence the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return. Lastly, the conducted interviews will be presented, with relevant discussion 
regarding findings from both the market model and the regression models.    
6.1 Sample Characteristics 
As described in section 5.1.1, a total of 205 individual announcements was gathered from the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. This section presents the original sample and two subsamples; The Full 
Sample, The Norwegian Sample, and The Trimmed Sample, which are the foundation of our 
quantitative analysis. Further, the Cumulative Abnormal Return has been computed for all 
three samples. However, only the Norwegian Sample and the Trimmed Sample are utilized in 
the cross-sectional analysis. 
6.1.1 The Full Sample 
In theory, the Full Sample should have contained 205 observations. However, two separate 
problems occurred, which resulted in the utilization of only 177 observations. The first 
complication occurred when some observations missing the related stock returns, made us 
unable to compute the daily abnormal returns and the following CARs. This was resolved by 
removing all observations where the dataset was missing a large proportion of the daily 
returns. Confounding events were the second complication. Confounding events implies that 
some companies conduct several repurchases over a short period. Hence, some of the event 
windows overlap in calendar time, which generated interference. The confounding events, 
with both individual events affecting each other’s CAR´s, made it difficult to separate the 
effect from the individual announcement. Resolving these two problems left us with 177 





6.1.2 The Norwegian Sample 
The Full Sample contained 26 announcements from foreign companies with their share capital 
dual-listed, with a small percentage of their share capital listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The share repurchases regarding these companies were mainly linked to boosting the low 
liquidity or removing them entirely from the OSE. Information regarding the buybacks was 
also limited, with several other events happening abroad surrounding the announcements, 
further biasing the results. Since this dissertation aims to analyze the repurchase 
announcements on the OSE, we created a subsample without these 26 observations. This 
sample was named the Norwegian Sample and contained 151 observations for companies 
listed on the OSE.  
 
6.1.3 The Trimmed Sample 
The Norwegian Sample, based on the Full Sample, contained some observations that were 
affected by other events and information, rather than just the share repurchases announcements 
(illustrated in Appendix E). All observations that produced an abnormal return of +/- five 
percent surrounding the days of the share repurchase announcements were manually 
investigated throughout NewsWeb. This was done to identify other unrelated events 
surrounding the announcements with a forceful impact on the results. These observations are 
extreme values, and this resulted in a new subsample named the Trimmed Sample. The extreme 
values were removed to reduce the interference from other unrelated events because they were 
affecting the abnormal returns on the days surrounding the share repurchase announcements. 
Thus, preventing the sole effect of the announcements from being captured. The Trimmed 
Sample consist of 124 observations.  
6.2 Market Model Results 
Table 6.1 illustrates the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return following share repurchase 
announcements on the OSE from 2000 to 2020. Employing the market model allowed the 
CAAR to be computed for all three samples presented above. This presented positive results 
for almost all the event windows. Furthermore, the highest CAAR´s following the 






Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (%) for Repurchase Announcements from 
the Period 2000-2020 on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 Event Window 























































Note. – This table presents the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for the pre-determined event 







This formula is previously presented in section 4.4.1. 
Full sample: (N=177), Norwegian Sample: (N=151), Trimmed Sample: (N=124) 
All CAAR´s are given in percentage, example: Trimmed Sample (-2,2) = 0,77% 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
 
From Table 6.1, almost all the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for all the event 
windows yield a positive return. The CAAR from the announcement day and the day after 
(0,1) produced a significant result for both the Full Sample and the Trimmed Sample when 
examining the t-statistics and the p-values for all event windows. The CAAR for this event 
window is the highest across all three samples. This implies a short-term effect from the 
announcements regarding buyback of stocks, where the announcement day produced the 
highest abnormal return.  
 
First, the Full Sample produced a positive CAAR across all presented event windows. 
However, only the abnormal return from the day of the announcement and the day after (0,1) 
are statistically significant. This event window also produced the highest CAAR. Secondly, 
removing the foreign companies in the Norwegian Sample has shifted all the CAAR’s 





event window (-2,2) has shifted the value from positive to negative. The day of the 
announcement and the day after (0,1) still produce the highest abnormal return, consistent with 
the Full Sample coefficients. However, none of the CAARs from Norwegian Sample are 
statistically significant.  Lastly, the Trimmed Sample produces the highest coefficients across 
all the event windows. In addition, the event windows; (-1,1), (0,1), and (0,2) are significant, 
with the day of the announcement and the day after (0,1) producing the highest abnormal 
return. This is also consistent with the results from the two other samples. Which further 
substantiates that the effect from the repurchase announcements is short-term, with the highest 
abnormal return the day of the announcement.  
 
The CAAR’s ten days prior and ten days after the event (-10,10) is graphicly illustrated in 
figure 6.1. The graph is created using all three samples presented in this thesis.  
 
Figure (6.1) 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return Ten Days Prior and Ten Days After The 
Repurchase Announcements (-10, 10) 
 
NOTE.- This table illustrates the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR’s) ten days prior 
to and ten days after the announcement(-10,10) for all three samples presented. The abnormal 


























-12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12





Figure (6.1) illustrates that all CAAR’s fluctuate around zero percent the first six days before 
the announcement and slowly decline, with the lowest CAAR the day before the event. The 
repurchases can be timed; the company may repurchase after the stock price dips down. 
Potentially the firms avoid repurchasing shares right after a recent increase in the price. 
Hence, only if the repurchase was arbitrarily selected would one expect a flat trend 
beforehand. The graph for the Trimmed Sample has the most remarkable fluctuations 
following the announcement and is also the sample with the least interference with the 
removal of the extreme values. The event experienced an increase of around 1,3 percent 
before it experiences a slight decrease two days after the announcement, confirming that the 
effect is short-term. The findings from this analysis are comparable to Settem´s (2008) 
findings on actual share repurchases conducted in Norway. Settem (2008) found that the 
CAAR for the same event window (-10,10) behaves similarly to the findings in this 
dissertation. However, Settem (2008) reports a higher CAAR than our findings for the same 




















6.3 Abnormal Return for Proceeds of Use 
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns ten days prior and ten days after the 
announcements (-10, 10), categorized after the proceeds of use, are graphically illustrated in 
Figure (6.2). The graph is created from the Trimmed Sample.  
 
Figure (6.2) 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return Ten Days Prior and Ten Days After the 
Share Repurchase Announcement (-10, 10) Categorized by the Proceeds of Use 
 
NOTE.- This table illustrates the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR’s) categorized by 
the proceeds of use. The abnormal returns are calculated using the Market Model, and CAAR is 
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The proceeds of use appear to have a different effect on the CAAR. Employee Program is the 
category in our sample with the lowest effect on the CAAR, with an almost flat but positive 
curve. The moderate fluctuations in the share price are anticipated. The logical reason could 
be that share repurchases mainly is used for programs concerning share incentive programs. 
These repurchases have the most negligible amounts of shares repurchased in the Trimmed 
Sample. This is further illustrated in Table (6.2). These types of buybacks are also the most 
common on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The announcements concerning Increased Return have 
the highest effect on the CAAR, not only on the announcement day but also on the following 
days. This category of buybacks is related to increasing value for the shareholders. Further on, 
this could be viewed as both a supplement to and a substitute for an extraordinary dividend. 
Share repurchases with increasing returns as the primary purpose usually contain a more 
considerable amount of shares being repurchased, illustrated in Table (6.2), and it is 
anticipated that larger repurchases generate greater abnormal returns. Similar to Employee 
Program, Capital Structure has a modest effect on the CAAR, with a short-term gain on the 
share price. The categories Book Building and Not Specified produce similar graphical results. 
However, the category Book Building has a greater return on the announcement day. Book 
building contains announcements where the target is building up the firm’s base of treasury 
shares. This is to meet future obligations surrounding the demand in their stocks for various 
reasons, such as stock transactions. The category Not Specified consists of buybacks where 
the reason is not specified at the time of the announcement. Even though the reason is not 
















Size of Repurchase Programs (%) and the Proceeds of Use. 
 Statistical Properties 
Proceeds of Use Mean Median Min Max 
Employee Program 0,44 0,27 0,002 0,34 
Book Building 1,71 0,92 0,34 9,19 
Increase Return 2,4 2,25 0,07 8,42 
Capital Structure 1,52 1,15 0,05 3,77 
Not Specified 1,32 0,98 0,14 5,00 
Note.- This table illustrates the connection between proceeds of use and the size of the repurchase 
program, scaled by market capitalization.  The coefficients are present in (%) of the respective 
market capitalization. Values are computed using the Trimmed Sample.  
 
Table 6.2 illustrates the connection between the proceeds of use and the size of the repurchase 
programs, scaled by the respective market capitalization. Increased Return is the category with 
the largest repurchase programs measured by the mean and the median.  
6.4 Cross-Sectional Regression 
The primary purpose of the cross-sectional regression models is to analyze which factors affect 
the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for share repurchase announcements. Therefore, several 
regression models are employed. This section investigates the determinants of share 
repurchase announcement by performing OLS regressions (see Appendix A for the five OLS 
assumptions) for the CAR’s from both the Norwegian Sample and the Trimmed Sample.  The 
event window chosen for our regressions is the CAR for the announcement day and the day 
after (0,1). In addition, the regressions were repeated for the CAR’s the day prior to the 
announcement to the day after (-1,1). These results are presented in Appendix F.  
6.4.1 Cross-Sectional Norwegian Sample 
Table 6.3 illustrates the result from regressing the CAR’s from the announcement and the day 
after for the Norwegian Sample. The regressions are based on different factors related to both 
the company characteristics and the announcements. In addition, variables related to the 





included. The variable Employee Program has been excluded from the regressions to avoid 
the dummy variable trap and therefore used as the reference group. Buyback Size is scaled 
with the proceeds in percent of the market capitalization. The variable Liquidity is the average 
traded shares over the prior trading month in percent of the total shares issued. 
   
In Model (1), the Cumulative Abnormal Return is regressed on the proceeds of use. The model 
produces a low R-squared. This could be interpreted as the included variables poorly explains 
the variation in the CAR. However, the model only contains four variables. Both coefficients 
Book Building and Increase Return produce a higher return than the Employee Program 
(reference group). However, the coefficients are not significant. This is also graphically 
illustrated in Figure (6.2). 
 
Model (2) includes variables related to the characteristics of different companies, like the size 
and the performance of the stocks prior to the event. We have incorporated different traits for 
the companies, which could affect how the market perceives and reacts to the buybacks. Model 
(2) is the model with the lowest R-squared of all the regression models, with approximately 
two percent of the variation being explained by the included regressors. None of the 
coefficients from the regression are significant. Consequently, company characteristics seem 
to a negligible effect on the return following the share repurchase announcement. 
 
The next model (3) consists of factors related to the actual buyback information the 
announcements provide, like the repurchase size and proceeds of use. This model has higher 
explanatory power than Model (2) but does not provide any significant coefficients. The most 
surprising finding from this model is the coefficient Buyback Size, which shows that larger 
buyback programs yield a lower CAR. Both the use of a third-party broker and the offering to 
buy the shares at a premium seem to positively affect the CAR, even though the coefficients 
are not significant. The impact from Book Building seems to have been mitigated with the 
introductions of more explanatory variables.  
 
The fourth model (4) includes variables from all the data collected. The model includes 
variables that aim to capture how company characteristics, the information provided from the 
announcements, and news leading up to the event, affect the CAR. The liquidity and the trend 
of the shares are also included. Model (4) produces the highest R-squared of all the models, 





This can be interpreted that paying dividends the previous year has a negative effect on returns 
following the buyback announcement. The coefficient Market Capitalization is positive as 
opposed to the finding by Skjelltorp (2004). However, the coefficient is not significant. 
Looking at the coefficient for the Buyback Size, the result is quite surprising, with larger 
buybacks yielding lower abnormal returns, but this is also not significant. Settem (2008) and 
Skjelltorp (2004) find that negative share performance prior to the buyback creates a higher 
abnormal return. This does not coincide with our model.  Liquidity seems to have the highest 
impact on the stock return of all the variables, with a positive correlation with the abnormal 



























Regression Results from the Norwegian Sample with the Cumulative Abnormal Return 
for the Event Window (0,1) as the Dependent Variable 






















































































Observations  151 151 149 149 
R2 0,0341 0,0212 0,0687 0,0990 
Adj R2 0,0076 -0,0267 0,0084 -0,0102 





NOTE.- This is the output generated in our cross-sectional regression when regressing CAR (0,1) as 
the dependent variable. All independent variables are presented in section 5.3. This output is 
generated using the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression method.  
All coefficients have standard errors presented (parenthesis) below the coefficients. These regression 
models have utilized the Norwegian Sample. 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01  
 
6.4.2 Cross-Sectional Trimmed Sample 
To further investigate the variation in the Cumulative Abnormal Return, the same regression 
models from Table (6.3) were repeated, using the Trimmed Sample. This resulted in several 
coefficients now producing significant values, with higher explanatory power for all the 
models.  The results are presented in Table (6.4).  
 
Model (1) now explains a lot more of the variation in the CAR, with the R-squared doubling 
compared to the same model from the Norwegian Sample. The model now also produces 
significant coefficients at the five percent level for Book Building and Increased Return after 
the removal of the extreme values. Both variables have a positive effect on the CAR compared 
to the reference group. This is consistent with the findings in the Norwegian Sample and with 
Figure (6.2), even though the coefficients in the Norwegian Sample are insignificant. Turning 
to the variables Capital Structure and Not Specified, both these have shifted from negative to 
positive with the utilization of the Trimmed Sample. However, these two variables do not 
present any statistically significant coefficients.  
 
Comparing Model (2) for both samples, the Trimmed Sample explains more of the variation 
in the CAR with a higher R-squared. However, the R-squared in this model is still low and 
does not produce any significant values for any of the two samples. The results from both 
these regressions could interpret that company characteristics and previous actions have little 
explanatory power for how the stock market reacts to the buyback announcements. Another 
explanation could be that the samples contain few observations. The coefficient Market 
Capitalization is now negative and coherent with Settem's (2008) and Skjelltorp's (2004) 
finding. However, our study did not manage to produce a significant value.     
 
The third Model (3) also has higher explanatory power for the Trimmed Sample and produces 





Size changes from negative to a positive and is now statistically significant. Furthermore, this 
could indicate that larger buybacks positively affect the abnormal returns, contrary to the 
results from Settem (2008). In addition, the variable Increased Return has decreased compared 
to Model (1) after the inclusion of the variable Buyback Size. These two explanatory variables 
are correlated, as illustrated in Table (6.2). Repurchasing shares during the financial crisis also 
seems to be perceived positively, although it should be interpreted with caution due to the low 
number of buybacks in our samples during this period. 
 
In Model (4), the explanatory power more than doubles when changing the sample from the 
Norwegian Sample to the Trimmed Sample. As presented in Model (3), the Buyback Size is 
still significant, with a slight reduction in the coefficient. Dividend is in addition no longer 
significant opposed to Model (4) for the Norwegian Sample. Introducing the Model (2) 
variables into Model (4) seem not to validate our preliminary belief that company 
characteristics and their previous actions have a forceful impact on the CAR following a 
repurchase announcement. However, both Settem (2008) and Skjelltorp (2004) find that the 
share-trend leading up to the event has a negative covariance with the CAR. This does not 
coincide with the findings from these models. However, the variable is not significant. 
Furthermore, Liquidity also seems to contradict the findings from Skjelltorp (2004). However, 
discrepancies exist between the results for this variable when comparing the different models, 
with all values being insignificant. Previously mentioned, Skjelltorp (2004) find that market 
capitalization has a significant negative correlation with the returns. This does not coincide 














Regression Results from the Trimmed Sample with The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
for the Event Window (0,1) as the Dependent Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 













































































































Observations 124 124 122 122 
R2 0,0759 0,0460 0,1755 0,2147 
Adj R2 0,0449 -0,0115 0,1093 0,0950 





NOTE.- This is the output generated in the cross-sectional regression when regressing CAR (0,1) as the 
dependent variable. All independent variables are extracted in section 5.3. This output is generated 
using the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression method.  
All coefficients have belonging standard errors presented in (parenthesis) below the coefficient. These 
regression models have utilized the Trimmed Sample. 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01  
 
6.5 Interviews Findings 
This section presents findings from the seven conducted interviews and the qualitative 
analysis. The analysis explores the impact share repurchases have on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
the usage of own shares, and different aspects regarding share repurchases. The results are 
presented in different sections, where the qualitative findings will be connected with the 
quantitative results.  
6.5.1 Proceeds of Use 
One recurring factor is the use of own shares connected to employee programs, 85 percent of 
our respondent states that employee programs are the main reasons they repurchase their 
shares. The majority of our respondents also perceive this as a recurring reason for other 
companies listed on the OSE. Furthermore, this is in line with findings from the data collection 
for the thesis, where 39 percent is connected to employee programs. Secondly, companies 
repurchase shares to be used for future acquisitions. This creates a commitment when 
acquiring another company. Thus, the acquired firm will have a stake in the acquiring 
company, compared to when the acquisition is made with cash. A third reason was to keep the 
number of shares on the same level after several years with employee programs and mentions 
that a company policy was to keep the number of shares approximately equal on a year-to-
year basis. A CFO answered for two separate companies and answered that the main reason 
they repurchased shares was a form of share treatment. Both shares were what he called semi-
liquid, and by repurchasing these shares, they offered long-term investors an opportunity to 
sell larger portions of shares. Moreover, the difference between Norwegian and foreign 
shareholders was mentioned. Foreign shareholders experience the withholding tax, where 
dividends are taxed at a higher percentage compared to share repurchases. By doing both, they 





investing in other projects. This individual was also the only participant utilizing the 
repurchase of shares as a substitute for dividends, thus increasing shareholder return. From the 
data collected, only 19 percent of the share repurchases are linked to increasing shareholder 
returns. This coincides with the number of companies interviewed that have conducted share 
repurchases for this specific reason. None of our participants have repurchase shares to adjust 
the capital structure or to be used in the process of book building.  
6.5.2 Repurchases as a Substitute for Dividends 
All respondents answered that if their company had excess cash for one period, they would all 
prefer to pay this out as a dividend compared to repurchasing shares. However, some 
individuals viewed share repurchases as a more flexible way of returning excess cash. Another 
interesting perspective was connected to smaller amounts of excess cash. If the amount was 
too small to be paid out as an extraordinary dividend, share repurchases could be a more 
suitable way of returning the profits to shareholders. Other participants viewed share 
repurchases as an excellent substitution to a dividend if the stock is underpriced compared to 
the underlying assets. Thus, making share repurchases a suitable method for returning excess 
cash under certain circumstances. This fits with the graphical illustrations of the Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns in Figure (6.1), where there is found evidence that repurchase 
announcements may be timed with repurchases conducted after a price decrease. Combining 
traditional dividends and share repurchases were also mentioned as a preferred method to keep 
shareholders satisfied. In addition, one individual mentioned the importance of consistency in 
the dividend pay-out policy. A reduction in the dividend yield could be interpreted as a 
negative signal, thus having a negative effect on the share price. Another respondent 
mentioned that large Norwegian shareholders prefer dividends over share repurchases. 
However, from a foreign investor´s point of view, share repurchases could be the preferable 
pay-out policy due to investor taxation. The dilemma would be which investors to prioritize, 
and the CFO explains this as a balance point on managing their shareholder base. The same 
CFO presents a theory where share repurchases could be perceived as a more aggressive 
method of showing shareholders that they are optimistic about the company's future. Thus, 
they choose to use excess cash to repurchase shares instead of paying out a dividend. This 
signals the lack of investment opportunities and future growth potential. Further on, he 
presented a historical example where they received a large amount of excess cash; the 





Subsequently, the individual received some complaints from larger Norwegian shareholders 
who expected a larger portion of dividends. This emphasizes how Norwegian shareholders 
view dividends compared to repurchase programs. Moreover, in our regression models, we 
found that the combination of dividend and repurchasing stocks may not be the best approach, 
with the dividend from the previous year having a negative correlation with the abnormal 
return following a repurchase announcement. However, these repurchases could be associated 
with smaller programs because most of the excess cash is already spent on the dividends. In 
addition, this was only statically significant for one of the models. 
6.5.3 Share Price 
None of the interview objects reported that share price is an important factor when conducting 
share repurchases. Therefore, while conducting the actual repurchase, the share price is not 
something they contemplate. This contradicts the findings from the quantitative analysis, 
where we find evidence that the announcements are being timed and repurchases are 
conducted following a decrease in share price. However, most participants have used share 
repurchases to cover commitments for employee programs, which may have affected their 
opportunity to time the buybacks. This can be seen in Figure (6.2), with the graph for Employee 
Programs experiencing negligible movement leading up to, and after the event. One individual 
presented an interesting example for the timing of the repurchases with the statement, “If we 
think the share price is high at a given time and thereby would prefer to repurchase shares at 
another time, this will send a negative signal to our shareholders that we, from an inside 
position, find the share price unusual high. Hence, not a great signal to send to the market.” 
He also stated that being “Price-setters” is not preferred by anyone and mentions how the 
tendency is lower to conduct a share repurchase program if the share price is at an all-time 
high. Furthermore, if the share price is substantially low, it is usually for a reason, and this 
creates precautions on how companies utilize excess cash. Other respondents informed us 
about the strict regulations regarding share repurchases in Norway and explained that they 
want to finish the repurchase program within a short time frame. There are several reasons for 
this justification, and the most important one is that the companies would want to avoid trading 
from an inside position. Our interviewees represent a variety of large corporations in Norway, 
which continuously receive new information. Repurchasing shares before announcing 
important information would be classified as insider trading. This constant stream of 





solely from the repurchase announcements. In the quantitative analysis, the Trimmed Sample 
was created to mitigate this problem. 
6.5.4 Abnormal Return 
The majority of the respondents have not experienced any abnormal returns while conducting 
a share repurchase or publishing the announcement of a share repurchase program. In addition, 
the respondents did not perceive this as a justification for conducting share repurchases nor 
mentioned share repurchases as a solution for a low share price. This is not consistent with our 
findings in the quantitative analysis, where we found significant and positive abnormal returns 
following share repurchase announcements. One individual understood the undervaluation 
perspective. However, mentioned that this was not a preferred method. A second respondent 
explained how their stock is characterized by low liquidity and believes this could result in 
some abnormal return. Nevertheless, he comments on how the repurchase program was 
introduced during an upward trending share price connected to a good quarter and several 
good news. This contradicts previous findings from Skjelltorp (2004) and Settem (2008), with 
a negative trend prior to the event having a significant positive effect on the abnormal return. 
However, the result from our cross-sectional analysis finds an upward sloping trend having a 
positive correlation with the returns even though none of these coefficients are significant. In 
addition, the results from our analysis did not find any consistent relationship between the 
stock returns following the announcements and the liquidity of the stock. One participant 
regularly experienced an increase in share price after announcing a share repurchase, and he 
also states how quickly this was adjusted and returned to the original share price. Moreover, 
this coincides with our findings, with the repurchase generating a positive short-term abnormal 
return. This was also the only participant utilizing the repurchase as an alternative to dividends, 
presenting that the proceeds of use matter, which is similar to the findings in this thesis. 
Although, this could also be linked to buyback size, with larger programs having a greater 
impact as presented in our regression models. He also mentioned how previously share 
repurchases generated a larger abnormal return as the regulations were less strict and came as 
larger shocks. The company mitigates this problem by informing all shareholders about the 
share repurchases in order to be consistent. Their goal is to have a long-term, sustainable, and 






Announcing the actual repurchase is practiced differently by the participants. Certain 
respondents publish a separate announcement stating they are about to start a repurchase 
program, the length of the program, and estimated volume. Others initiate the process after 
getting approval at the annual general meeting. Most of the repurchases conducted on the OSE 
are initiated after getting approval at the annual general meeting without publishing a separate 
announcement in advance. This was discovered during the data collection. Several interview 
objects mention the new Safe Harbour regulation introduced in Norway March 1th, 2021, and 
how they have not repurchased shares after the implementation. The new MAR regulation 
applies stricter guidelines for information publishing to avoid insider trading and market 
manipulation. Issuer’s reporting obligations lapse with trades in their own shares, however, 
under the new regulation, the issuer must publish trades made under the repurchase program 
no later than seven days after the transaction is completed (Euronext, 2021). Nevertheless, 
none of our observations from the quantitative analysis are affected by the implementation of 
the new MAR regulation since this analysis only focuses on the period from 2000 to 2020. 
The implementation of the new regulation has been mentioned on several occasions 
throughout the interviews. All the participants commented on how they would communicate 







The purpose of this thesis is to examine the signaling effect of share repurchase 
announcements on the Oslo Stock Exchange. This dissertation found that most share 
repurchases in Norway are conducted without publishing a separate announcement after 
receiving approval at the annual general meeting.  
 
All announcements in our selected period (2000-2020) have been gathered from NewsWeb. 
This resulted in 205 separate share repurchase announcements. However, only 177 
observations were utilized in the analysis due to missing stock returns and confounding events. 
Further, three different samples were created as the foundation of the analysis. The first sample 
contained all the 177 observations, hence named the Full Sample. Utilizing the event study 
methodology presented by MacKinlay (1997), this sample produced a significant positive 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for the day of the announcement and the day after (0,1). 
For the second sample, the announcements from dual-listed companies, with only a small 
percentage of their share capital listed on the OSE, were excluded. This sample was named 
the Norwegian Sample and contained 151 observations, producing a positive but not 
significant coefficient for the day of the announcement and the following day (0,1). Lastly, 
the Trimmed Sample was created to mitigate how other unrelated events and information 
affects the abnormal return surrounding the event of interest (further discussed in section 7.1). 
This sample produced a positive and significant coefficient for the day of the announcement 
and the following day (0,1). In addition, the event windows (-1,1) and (0,2) also produced 
positive and statistically significant values.  
 
Chapter 6 utilizes the OLS regression method, where the CAR from the day of the 
announcement and the following day (0,1) is used as the dependent variable. Thus, trying to 
analyze which factors affect the variation in the CAR’s computed using the market model.  
Several independent variables chosen were retrieved from other empirical studies like Settem 
(2008) and Skjelltorp (2004). This allowed us to compare some of the results with earlier 
studies. First, four different regression models were utilized for the Norwegian Sample, where 
the CAR from the day of the announcement and the following day (0,1) was applied as the 
dependent variable. Furthermore, the same regressions were also conducted for the Trimmed 





samples were significantly different, with the Trimmed Sample doubling the explanatory 
power of the models and producing an increased amount of statistically significant 
coefficients. Dividend was the only significant variable retrieved from the regressions utilizing 
the Norwegian Sample, implying that paying dividends in the previous year has a negative 
effect on the CAR following a share repurchase announcement. These models yielded a 
different result for the Trimmed Sample, with significant variables such as Buyback Size and 
Book Building. Hence, the size of the buyback program seems to have a positive correlation 
with the cumulative abnormal return.  
 
To further investigate buyback announcements and their impact on share prices, a total of 
seven interviews were conducted with executives from companies with repurchase history on 
the OSE. One interesting finding from the interviews was the different opinions regarding the 
topic. Seven interviews are not sufficient to represent the whole of OSE. Nevertheless, it 
substantiates our findings from the quantitative analysis, even though most of the respondents 
repurchased shares for employee programs. The objects mentioned repurchases as a substitute 
for traditional dividends. In addition, an alternative method of returning excess cash to 
shareholders. However, most participants stated that dividends are the preferred method for 
returning excess cash to their shareholders. 
 
All respondents believed that employee programs were the primary reason for share 
repurchases in Norway, which coincide with our findings from the data analysis. None of the 
respondents emphasized the share price as a key variable when repurchasing shares. However, 
evidence from the quantitative analysis illustrates how the announcements could have been 
timed as the findings highlight that repurchases are conducted following a decrease in the 
share price. Most of the respondents have not experienced an increase in the share price 
following the repurchase announcements. This contradicts the findings from the event study, 
which found a positive abnormal return. However, one individual experienced a minor short-
term gain. This coincides with the results for the quantitative analysis, implying a short-term 
CAAR following the announcement. In addition, one of the participants mentions how the low 
stock liquidity and the trend prior to the repurchase announcement may have contributed to a 
further increase in the share price following the buyback announcement. None of the 
regression models found a statistically significant correlation between the abnormal return and 





repurchases; some participants announced the program before repurchasing shares, while 
others initiate without publishing a separate announcement.  
 
This quantitative and qualitative analysis elaborates on the share repurchase phenomena in 
Norway and adds valuable research to previous literature. The conducted interviews show a 
disagreement on the topic and the benefit of conducting share repurchases. Our analysis found 
a short-term and positive abnormal return following a buyback announcement, with the size 
of the buyback being the most important explanatory variable.    
7.1 Potential Improvements 
One of the most significant drawbacks when conducting an event study is the assumption that 
the information provided by the event is not anticipated and already incorporated in the stock 
price. The models used to find the normal return also have limitations; this is discussed in 
section 4.8. Conducting the event study, we experienced two problems regarding the data. The 
first was related to the low number of repurchases announcements, especially before the year 
2008. Several of the earlier announcements were also missing information for the planned 
repurchase amount and the proceeds of use. The second problem encountered in this thesis 
was the absence of daily stock returns for specific firms, especially for the earlier years in our 
researched period. Combined with confounding events, these two problems left us with 177 
usable observations for the Full Sample.  
 
Regulations surrounding the repurchase of treasury shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange also 
caused some problems regarding interference. When repurchasing shares, companies must 
disclose information that could impact the share price, preventing them from trading from an 
inside position. Consequently, other information and unrelated events affected the share price 
surrounding the day of the announcement. This led to several observations being disrupted by 
quarterly reports and other information affecting the stock price (illustrated in Appendix E). 
To some extent, this was overcome by manually checking all the information surrounding the 
announcements and remove the observation with disruptive information. Therefore, the 







Lastly, seven interviews are not enough to represent the Oslo Stock Exchange as a whole. 
Thus, this thesis could have included more interviews to further substantiate the quantitative 
findings. However, it managed to enlighten the different perspectives regarding share 
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Ordinary Least Squares Assumptions    
 
I. Linear in Parameters  
The first assumption is that a regression model is linear in parameters (Wooldridge, 
2012). In statistics, a regression model is linear when all terms in the model are a 
constant or multiplied with an independent variable.  
II. Random Sampling  
The sample drawn from the population must be a result of a random sampling 
(Wooldridge, 2012). Random sampling is done to avoid correlating variables 
(hopefully).  
III. Zero Conditional Mean 
According to the zero conditional mean assumption, the expected value of the error 
terms has a zero-mean value (Wooldridge, 2012). The error term accounts for 
variation in the dependent variable, which is not explained by the independent 
variables.  
IV. No Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity appears when two or more explanatory variables in a multiple 
regression model are highly correlated (Wooldridge, 2012). Multicollinearity 
imposes a problem to a regression model as the coefficients will be wrongly 
estimated.  
V. Homoscedasticity 
The fifth assumption is homoscedasticity and applies that the variance of the error 
terms should be homoscedastic (Wooldridge, 2012). This implies that the error 
terms variance should be independent of the explanatory variables, and therefore 










Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Subject: Share repurchases on Oslo Stock Exchange 
Purpose: Enlighten the subject of share repurchases in Norway and how the proceeds are 
used in practice 
- Introducing ourself and thanking the participant for participating 
- Inform about taking notes during interview and receive approval of this 
- Inform about the expected length of the interview and information about our 
thesis 
 
We first give a brief introduction of our thesis and what we want to shed light on before we 
move on to the following six questions: 
 
Question 1: What is the main reason why your company repurchases shares?  
 
Question 2: Do you look at the share price before you buy back your own shares? 
How much do you emphasize the course? 
 
Question 3: Do you feel that a repurchase can seem like an extraordinary dividend, 
and is it a "better" way to give back to shareholders? 
 
Question 4: What do you think is the most common reason to buy back own shares on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange? 
 
Question 5: Have you been included in a buy-back program, and do you feel/have you 
experienced that this boosts the share price of the company? 
 
Question 6: If you choose to make a repurchase, do you issue a separate announcement 






Thanking the interview participant for participating and informing that any participant can 






















Sector Composition for All Companies in Our Data Sample  
 
NOTE.-This graph illustrates the sector characteristics of our data sample as of 31.12.2020. We 
































Examples of Text Retrieved from NewsWeb (2021) and the Corresponding Use of 
Proceeds Category 






Reference is made to American 
Shipping Company ASA's ("ASMC" 
or the "Company") stock exchange 
notice dated 29 March, 2017 where 
AMSC announced its intent to 
purchase 25,000 treasury shares in 
connection with its incentive scheme 
for employees. 
 
DNB ASA 24/10/2019 Capital 
Structure 
In order to enable an optimal level of 
capital in the company, DNB ASA has 
decided to initiate a new share buy-
back programme.  
The buy-back programme comprises 
up to 0.5 per cent of DNB ASA's 
shares, which represents a total of 7 














Norwegian Energy Company ASA 
("Noreco" or the "Company") has 
decided to initiate a share buyback of 
up to 360,000 shares of the Company 
for corporate purposes. The buyback 
will be conducted as a reverse book 
building process at a price to be 
decided by the Company up to a 
maximum of NOK 248 per share, 
which represents an 8.5% premium to 
the closing price of the Company´s 




14/05/2019 Increase Return Following the Telenor’s Annual 
General Meeting (“AGM”) on 7 May 
2019, Telenor Group has decided to 
execute a 2019-20 share buyback 
programme of up to 43 million shares.  





return of NOK 7.3 billion to 
shareholders. This comes in addition 
to the FY 2018 ordinary dividend of 
NOK 8.40 per share, of which NOK 
4.40 will be paid in May 2019 and 
remaining NOK 4.00 will be paid out 
in October 2019. 
DNO 
International 
27/03/2017 Not Specified Oslo, 27 March 2017 - DNO ASA, the 
Norwegian oil and gas operator, has 
initiated 
a new share buyback program and on 
24 March 2017 purchased 150,000 
own shares at 
a price of NOK 6.9438 per share. The 
timing and volume of further share 
purchases will depend on market 
conditions. 
NOTE.- The purpose of this table is to provide readers with the rationale behind our justification 
of proceeds of use based on the information published on NewsWeb. The typical wording is 









Interference (-3,3) Days from Announcement Day 
Days -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total 
Quarterly reports 2 4 1 27 0 0 0 34 
Other interference 3 6 5 12 4 0 3 33 
Total 5 10 6 39 4 0 3 67 









Regression Results from the Norwegian Sample with The Cumulative Abnormal 
Return for the Event Window (-1,1) as the Dependent Variable 






















































































Observations  151 151 149 149 





Adj R2 0,0131 -0,0180 -0,0032 -0,0229 
F Statistic (4, 146)=1,50 (7, 143)=0,62 (9, 139)=0,95 (16, 132)=0,79 
NOTE.- This is the output generated in the cross-sectional regression when regressing CAR (-1,1) as 
the dependent variable. The independent variables are extracted in section 5.3. This output is 
generated using the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression method.  
All coefficients have belonging standard errors presented in (parenthesis) below the coefficient. 
These regression models have utilized the Norwegian Sample. 
































Regression Results from the Trimmed Sample with The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
for the Event Window (-1,1) as the Dependent Variable 






















































































Observations  124 124 122 122 
R2 0,0432 0,0211 0,1061 0,1237 
Adj R2 0,0110 -0,0379 0,0343 -0,0099 





NOTE.- This is the output generated in the cross-sectional regression when regressing CAR (-1,1) as 
the dependent variable. The independent variables are extracted in section 5.3. This output is 
generated using the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression method.  
All coefficients have belonging standard errors presented in (parenthesis) below the coefficient. 
These regression models have utilized the Trimmed Sample. 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
